| War in Chad | |||||||
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Major flashpoints of the conflict |
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| Belligerents | |||||||
| United Front for Democratic Change (FUC) (2005-2006) United Forces for Development and Democracy (UFDD) Gathering of Forces for Change (RFC) National Accord of Chad (CNT) Janjaweed Allegedly supported by: Sudan (until 2010)[1] |
Chad | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 710+ military deaths (Chadian estimate) | 430+ military deaths (official casualties) | ||||||
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The civil war in Chad[2] began in December 2005. Since its independence from France in 1960, Chad has been swamped by the civil war between the Arab-Muslims of the north and the Sub-Saharan-Christians of the south.[3] As a result, leadership and presidency in Chad drifted back and forth between the Christian southerners and Muslim northerners. When one side was in power, the other side usually started a revolutionary war to counter it. France, the former occupying imperial power, and Chad's northern neighbour Libya have both become involved at various times throughout the civil war. By the mid-1990s the civil war had somewhat stabilised, and in 1996 Idriss Déby, a northerner, was confirmed president in Chad's first democratic election.[4] In 1998 an armed rebellion began in the north, led by President Déby's former defence chief, Youssouf Togoimi. However, a Libyan peace deal in 2002 failed to put an end to the fighting. In 2003, conflict in the neighbouring Darfur region in Sudan leaked across the border into Chad.[5] Refugees from Sudan were joined by Chad civilians who were trying to escape rebel violence and eventually filled the camps. It was clear that Chad's rebels received weapons and assistance from the government of Sudan. At the same time, Sudan's rebels got help from Chad's government. In February 2008, three rebel groups joined forces and launched an attack on Chad's capital, N'Djamena.[6] France sent in troops to clear up the government. Many of the rebels were former allies of President Idriss Déby. They accused him of corruption towards members of his own tribe.
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The battle at the start of December 2005 in the Chadian capital N'djamena came as no surprise. For the years prior to the eruption, the Sudanese government was trying to overthrow the Chadian president, Idriss Déby, using Chadian rebels as middle men. The three armed groups involved in one of the most recent attacks in 2008 were all extensively armed by Sudanese security forces, which had the clear intent of cutting off the support that Déby was giving to the rebels in Darfur, especially the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), which had been on the offensive in Darfur. The current war in Chad is a result of four distinct forces.[7]
For one, the war appeared to be a continuation of the conflicts of Darfur and Chad, which include the competition for power and land. Secondly, there was an internal Chadian conflict. Déby reverted to a one-man military rule after a hopeful broadening of the base of his regime in the late 1990s which was coupled by the growth of civil politics in N'djamena.[8] Déby relied heavily on a close-knit group of kinsmen and on claiming the alloted government finances for his own agenda, distributing aid in return for civilian loyalty. Third is Khartoum's (capital of Sudan) strategy for managing security within its border, which include treating the weak surrounding states as merely extensions of its internal limits. The Sudan security helped bring Déby to power in 1990 as part of their responsibility that also saw it engage militarily in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Central African Republic over the military decade.[9] In the same way that Khartoum used a combination of extortion and retribution to control its provincial elites in Darfur, it uses the same tools to influence its trans-border limits. Furthermore, the regional competition for dominance through an immense area of central Africa has rarely been governed by state authority. This boondock includes Chad, CAR, and northern DRC, as well as the areas of Tripoli, Sudan, Kinshasa, Kigali, Kampala, and even Asmara are competing for influence across this area, as well as Khartoum.[10]
The implementation of the reforms promised in an August 2007 agreement with opposition parties was slow and uneven.[11] Throughout the country, government forces continued to arbitrarily arrest and detain civilians and suspected rebels, often on the basis of ethnicity, and subject them to cruel and unusual punishment. Chad's prison conditions are among the harshest on the African continent. Weak institutions of justice contributed to a culture of exemption. The government has not investigated or prosecuted serious abuses against civilians, such as killings and rapes by government security forces and rebels following clashes at Am Dam in May 2009.[12] More than 250,000 Sudanese refugees and 168,000 Chadian displaced people live in camps and elsewhere in eastern Chad. In April, approximately 5,000 new Sudanese refugees arrived from West Darfur, following renewed fighting there between the Sudanese rebel group Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Sudanese government forces.[13]
The conflict involved Chadian government forces and several Chadian rebel groups. These include the United Front for Democratic Change, United Forces for Development and Democracy, Gathering of Forces for Change and the National Accord of Chad. The conflict has also involved the Janjaweed, while Sudan allegedly supported the rebels, while Libya mediated in the conflict, as well as diplomats from other countries.
In January 2009, the government of Chad requested that the United Nations begin the process of withdrawing the peacekeeping mission in eastern Chad. The Chad government criticized the UN mission's slow deployment, uneven record of success, and improvements in the security situation as reasons for its decision. In May 2009, the UN revised the mission's mandate and authorized its gradual drawdown and closure by the end of the year, and effectively shifted full responsibility for the protection of civilians, including displaced populations and refugees from Darfur, to the Chadian security forces.[14]
An agreement for the restoration of harmony between Chad and Sudan, signed January 15, 2010, marked the end of a five-year war.[15] The fix in relations led to the Chadian rebels from Sudan returning home, the opening of the border between the two countries after seven years of closure, and the deployment of a joint force to secure the border. President Idriss Déby visited Khartoum, in February for the first time in six years; and in July, Chad, a state party to the International Criminal Court (ICC), hosted Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, earning the doubtful claim of being the first ICC member state to harbor a suspect from the court.[16] Peacekeepers from the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) have been in eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic since mid-2008 with a mandate to protect refugees and displaced populations, facilitate humanitarian assistance, and promote human rights.[17] Following the UN decision to draw down the mission by the end of 2010, representatives of UN agencies formed a working group with the Chadian government to improve security for humanitarian groups in eastern Chad. The plan includes consolidation of the Chadian Integrated Security Detachment (DIS), a component of MINURCAT consisting of Chadian police forces trained by the UN, which provide security in and around the refugee camps.[18] However, the plans do not clearly address the security concerns of refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), or the local population.
Bilateral relations between Canada and Chad are limited Canada supports efforts to re-establish peace, security and political dialogue in the region.[19] The conflicts between the government and rebel groups, the humanitarian crisis at the border between Chad and Sudan (Darfur region) as well as the tensions between the two countries contribute to the instability of the region. Canada encourages Chad and Sudan to continue to normalise their relations.[20]
Canadian aid in Chad is mainly of a humanitarian nature and is dispensed through multilateral and international organizations channels such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) provides training grants to Chad through the Canadian Francophonie Grants Program.[21] Canada also finances local projects through the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives, which is managed by the Canadian High Commission in Yaoundé, Cameroon.[22] .
Although the civil war in Chad ended with the signing of the peace treaty, it is clear that the country is, and still will be, in distress for a very long time. Regarding the security situation in Chad, since the clash between Government and opposition forces earlier in 2009,[23] the powerful government’s strength had been greatly diminished and many had retreated into Sudan. However, a large number of demobilized soldiers and weapons were now loose in Chad, which encouraged criminal activity. Organized gangs tried to make a living by attacking humanitarian actors, and two kidnappings had taken place in the past two months. Indeed, urgent action is needed to prevent a further deterioration of the region. With such a high level of criminal activity, when criminals do not respect the country, and were attack anyone and anything, humanitarian aid will be all the more difficult. Without a large presence of army personnel to ensure law and order, there would never be any possibility of helping internally displaced persons and refugees as necessary.
Undoubtedly, the civilians are going to be in dire need for aid for years to come. Looking ahead, a combination of challenges must be tackled, including spreading criminality, malnutrition, food security, and the election of the next successor. However, feeding and sheltering people will not be enough to give them a decent life. Although there is an 82% coverage, to have just 3% on health and 2% on education meant that the international community was not fulfilling its mission.[24] While it is sometimes difficult to rehabilitate refugees for life outside the camps, incentives could be provided to the displaced population, such as programmes of economic assistance for agriculture and livestock, microcredit, and help in dealing with land-rights issues.